Notes � Hume, induction

Hume points to 2 types of knowledge (???) we lay claim to: relations of ideas and matters of fact, which correspond to a priori/reason-based knowledge and a posteriori/experience-based knowledge, maths/logic vs science etc. define a priori/posteriori.

When we examine matters of fact, we find that our justification for and root of all knowledge of matters of fact bottles down to cause and effect. Our expectations, predictions and explanation all come down to this (�I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects�) relation principle. And yet, even the most rational man would be unable to deduce or rationally apprehend the secret natural powers of any object, since effects need not be the way they are, that is to say, we would not derive a contradiction nor find it unintelligible if the sun were not to rise tomorrow. Our senses give us clues about how things will be and we utiltise them to/with great effect/success in our dealings with the world, but only insofar as we can associate events in our memory, induce similarities and see analogies which we generalise and codify as part of science�s gradual� and evolving set of laws.

Section IV, Part II

So matters of fact are based on our employment of the causal relation between events that we see around us; but that this principle is based wholly on experience, and no chain of reasoning can demonstrated divorced from our experience why this should necessarily be so � OR � why things should necessarily follow the particular causal relationships we have come to expect them to since the powers inehring in objects underlying the causal relationship/results are veiled from us.

Any attempted explanation of the way things are can only be interms of our other experiences which are similarly contingent.

Furthermore, any evidence from experience which supports or explains the causal relations that hold suffers itself from the same question, i.e. that it too assumes that the future will resemble the past. �When a man says, I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers: And when he says, Similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers, he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same.� Reason cannot help us, since peasants, infants and the brute beasts are perfectly able to adduce causal connections in everything around them. If I ask you to show me the chain of reasoning that you think affirms this connection, and you hesitate or ramble intricately, then you cannot be using the argument that all babes and beasts are able to employ. And finally, to point to the success of the technique is to miss the philosophical point of the question.

Section V, part I

He starts by discussing scepticism, arguing that it is the only philosophy where the philosopher�s temperamental prejudices do not sway him one way or the other; it is only the love of truth that drives it.

He then asks what principle, if not reason or experience, drives us to see cause and effect and assume that the future will resemble the past when all we have are regularities in the past; and unlike normal reasoning, the strength of our beliefs grow with every new instance, whereas in gemotry, for instance, we know as much from looking at one circle as at all the circles in the world.

This principle is �custom�, or �habit�. It conditions us with repetition to expect repetition. Its unerring certainty does not derive from a chain of reasoning from which we can deduce that the future resembles the past, rather takes our experiences and associated memories and habituates us to them. This is the principle that gives force to our expectations of the future on the basis of the constant conjunction of events (and the appearance of properties) in the past.

Section V, part II

He now considers the difference between fictions and beliefs. Clearly, if a belief is remarkable for consisting of a particular idea or content, then our versatile imagination could replicate that idea or content, and we would have not means of distinguishing fiction from belief. Instead, Hume resorts to a phenomenological differentiating factor which is difficult to pin down � he eventually characterises belief states as having greater force, liveliness, vividness and steadiness, in contrast to the fictitious productions of the imagination.

With this criteria, we are able to distinguish when the conjunction of two ideas results from custom as opposed to the (largely) voluntary workings o the imagination. He identifies 3 processes or means by which custom links ideas with each other: resemblance, contiguity and causation. He proceeds to give examples of how we have learned to utilise and recognise when memories or expectations arise/are evoked by sensory impressions by means of these relations.

�� He concludes by arguing for Nature�s wisdom in imbuing us with this efficacious, automatic, non-rational mechanism for navigating our world.

Notes � Russell, �Problems of philosophy�, chapter 6

In order to know anything outside the very narrow domain of private experience, we need to be able to draw inferences from general principles about the sense data. It all comes down to whether or not we havce reason to believe in the uniformity of nature. Even in exceptional-seeming cases like the sun not rising tomorrow, science depends(???) on any general rules which do admit exceptions eventually yielding to general rules which have no exceptions.

Just because past future have resembled past pasts, i.e. what was the future has constantly the consistenly come to be and to resemble the past � but we are still no more certain that past past/futures will definitely/necessarily resemble all future futures. Indeed we are really asking about all fresh instances, not just the future, but also outside the Solar System etc. (is there universality???)

It is harder of course to prove a general principle than particular cases by induction.

Notes � Dicker, �Hume�s epistemology and metaphysics: an introduction�, last part of the chapter on induction

Strawson pioneered the Oxford 1950s �ordinary language� argument in support of the idea that induction cannot be rationally justified, but is still rational. This requires two preliminary points:

induction is rational only if it can be justified (i.e. by argument)

this justification must fulfil certain requirements:

it cannot itself rely on induction at any point, so it must be deductive, i.e. it must show that every inductively correct argument can be converted to a deductively valid one

Hume considers and rejects the following candidate deductive argument:

(1) Past A-events have always been followed by B-events

(2) The future will resemble the past

�\

(3) If there is an A-event, there will be a B-event (or: present and future A-events will continue to be followed by B-events)

However, it would be circular to inductively justify (2) with the statement:

(4) The future has always resembled the past

On its own, (2) is not self-evident, and it is not demonstrable (its denial does not imply a contradiction), so the argument falls down.

This would seem to lead us to inductive scepticism, so we try and reject a premise, namely our assumption that �induction is rational only if it can be justified�. This is what Strawson opts to do, by arguing that �relying on induction is part of what it means to be rational, therefore induction is rational even if it cannot be justified� (Dicker). see Strawson quote.

Some object that the second point he regards as analytic, that the strength of the evidence is proportional to the number of instances and variety of circumstances, is question-begging � for surely this �analytic� proposition is already �[making] a normative claim to the effect that inductive evidence is genuine or good evidence for a proposition� (Dicker).

He also argues that to ask whether induction is a justified or justifiable procedure does not make sense. He is attacking our notion of what it means for something to be justified, or to require justification. By arguing that justification need not be deductive or demonstrative, he is effectively arguing that the force of the inductive principle is enough for it to be self-justifying. At one point, he appears to be arguing that �justification� as we use it in ordinary language always refers to an inductive justification, so it is no longer clear what the question means when we ask whether an inductive standard itself is reasonable, just as it makes little sense to ask whether the law is legal, for instance. It makes sense to ask about whether particulars fit in with the general principle, e.g. whether individual laws are legal, or whether a given belief is justified � but to ask whether the general principle from which we derive the reasonableness is itself reasonable � can this be reasonable? There is no higher standard by which to measure the reasonableness of inductive standards themselves.

His second argument is cleverer: he points out a distinction between:

(4) [the universe is such that] induction will continue to be successful

(5) induction is rational/reasonable

And considers that Hume is employing (4) in the deductive argument he rejects, while (5) is a lesser claim. (4) is a synthetic, a posteriori, contingent truth, while (5) is an analytic, a priori, necessary truth.

Notes � �Hume�, Barry Stroud

Discussion with Ben Cannon

what�s the relative epistemological status of inductive truths vs rational truths

3rd type of knowledge???

does Hume allow it???

inductive vs empirical truth??? definition of induction

Swinburne � trueness = probability is higher than any other proposition???

induction is more than just contingency, requires narrowing down

you frame a hypothetical universal statement, then modify it with every exception

what about causal

he�s not really castigating induction � he may even prefer it to reason, in many ways � he�s happy to admit it does the job better

how about efficacy as a justification???

pragmatism

are we constitutionally wired up to believe in causation � Custom seems an ineliminably important part of our psyche

causation as a Kantian category

Hume = Berkeley � God

�justified� � are you justified in believing in neminem laede???

rationally, not really. in an everyday sense, yes

internalism � what about coherence etc???

our success in inductively predicting can be measured

power of predictions is much greater than constant conjunction

foundationalism vs coherentism

does Hume think we are justified???

2 qs

what are the criteria for justification, for accepting induction as justified, i.e. are there any conditions in which we would be justified in accepting induction? (ours vs Hume�s requirements)

are we then justified?

justification for/vs uniformity of nature

Notes � web pages

Hume redirected our attention away from substances + properties to relations

Excerpts from commentaries

�It is an analytic proposition that is is reasonable to have a degree of belief in a statement which is proportional to the strength of the evidence in its favour; and it is an analytic proposition � that, other things being equal, the evidence for a generalisation is strong in proportion as the number of favourable instances, and the variety of circumstances in which they have been found, is great. So to ask whether it is reasonable to place reliance on inductive procedures is like asking whether it is reasonable to proportion the degree of one�s convictions on the strength of the evidence. Doing this is what �being reasonable� means in context.� � P. F. Strawson, 1952,� pp 256-7

Excerpts from primary texts

Points

Hume isn�t really a rock-hard empiricist

Surely it makes more sense to ask whether induction is a justifying procedure � yes, this is Strawson�s (second???) point

Can we not simply reply to the ordinary language argument that philosophy, certainly analytic philosophy, is the business of seeking certain knowledge. Inductive justification is never wholly certain. Only deductive knowledge can be. Therefore, when a philosopher asks the question of whether or not a given approach is justified (other than circularly), he is clearly seeking some extraneous, deductive proof � as Hume clearly states. Yes, of course the principle of induction is reasonable, but it is not rational. After all, if it was only inductive proof that philosophy required, we would be back to natural philosophy, rather than rationalism, and metaphysics would boil down to physics, and there would be no difference in epistemic status between my opinion of what colour a pair of trousers is as opposed to an analytic proposition. However, Strawson�s first argument is indeed clever.

add Dicker to the reading list

science = codified Custom (russell point about general rules with exceptions � general rules without exception)

Questions

Does it help us that our particle accelerators and other tools augment our senses and give us more direct access to the world than cavemen have???

no. still assumes that the laws underlying the working of the particle accelerators are universal and reliable, and just brings us unhelpfully back to the primary qualities/secondary qualities distinction.

Is it just that I don�t have enough information about the secret powers of bread???

with our scientific knowledge about molecules, carbohydrates and nutrition, it makes perfect sense � I can scan the bread and see that it has very little sugar inside, and so will not nourish me as much etc.

What�s wrong with internalist criteria???

are they epistemologically less valuable than some sort of chain of reasoning permanently vindicating causal relations in the external world???

Does he deny that we have any justification for believin gin a reification of ultimate natural laws, i.e. matter???

Life as a succession of events, like a film, rather than the one frame causing the next???

Hume as epiphenomenalist??? coherentist???

Hume theory of mind vs NN generalising, pattern-matching, association etc.???

How does Strawson�s second point help???

Are Dicker + Strawson contesting that questioning the validity of the induction principle is the same as questioning whether or not the laws of nature are uniform??? Are the two the same question???

How much of the last page of Dicker does Strawson cover???

What is it that is different about B being caused by A as opposed to the two coincidentally occurring one after the other???

Is causation simply repeated contiguity???

Does it help us to take Custom itself as our Archimedean point???

probably not, because the problem of induction still remains, even as applied to our own internal mechanisms

Does it make any difference that although we can�t prove the deductive validity of the original bedrock induction, within an inductive world we can certainly use reason???